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ABSTRACT 
In light of somatic and reproductive tradeoffs modeled in evolutionary theory, this 
thesis conducts two analyses of men’s behavior in the indigenous hunter-gatherer 
community of Ust’-Avam, northern Russia. First, a food-distribution network of men’s 
hunting documented in 2001 and 2003 is analyzed considering evolutionary models of 
food sharing: kin selection, reciprocal altruism, generosity signaling, and costly signaling. 
The frequency of inter-household food transfers from 36 donor households to 102 
recipient households are examined using matrix regression with independent variables 
representing embodied, material, and relational wealth. This analysis does not support the 
costly signaling model, but provides robust evidence for kinship, reciprocity, and 
generosity. Alongside evidence of hunter’s unidirectional food transfers to kin, hunters 
share reciprocally with kin and other highly skilled hunters. Furthermore, hunters appear 
to be sharing with the needy, rather than accumulating wealth, additional wives, or allies. 
Male fertility patterns of 272 Ust’-Avam men were analyzed using the same embodied, 
material, and relational wealth variables. Hunter skill (embodied) and hunter wealth 
(material) are found to be the strongest predictors of men’s age-adjusted reproductive 
success and age at first birth. Cash income, educational level, and number of close kin do 
not significantly predict men’s reproduction. Hunter production appears to be invested in 
their wives and existing offspring. Thus, the first analysis illustrates kin selection, 
reciprocity (kin irrespective of productive ability and non-kin with high cumulative 
producer capacity), and generosity. The second analysis illustrates male parental 
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investment effects for good hunters. Considering the cost of transportation out of the 
community and few wage labor opportunities for men, food production and distribution 
patterns are highly prosocial, and the behavior of men who are skilled and outfitted 
hunters appears also to provide some reproductive advantage.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Theoretical Background 
Many anthropologists look to hunting and gathering societies to provide insights 
into the behaviors of human ancestors. Knowing that all humans had hunting-and-
gathering economies prior to the development of other means of subsistence allows 
anthropologists to examine modern day hunter-gatherer societies in hopes of explaining 
the evolution of certain human traits. One of these traits is food sharing. In this thesis, I 
examine the hypotheses of food sharing as mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation 
and test data collected from Ust’-Avam male hunters. As many anthropologists have 
asked in other study areas, I ask why hunters in this community share food. What predicts 
these food transfers? How do these results support food sharing hypotheses? The findings 
from the results of the following analyses contribute to a larger debate, which seeks to 
answer why humans share food and how food-sharing evolved. Food-sharing is a 
cooperative behavior, and outside of provisioning, it seems to be a behavior at odds with 
natural selection. Food sharing is a universal human trait, and is found ubiquitously in 
hunter-gatherer societies, leading to evidence that the trait was selected for.  
In addition to examining why and how these hunters share food, I will also be 
examining their reproductive success and the effects of variables representing three 
different types of wealth. The first part of my thesis examines what a hunter does with the 
food he has acquired and chooses to distribute. The second part examines what a hunter 
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does with the food he decides to keep. Does he invest this meat into gaining access to 
new mates, investing it in potential offspring with other women? Or does he invest his 
resources into his current mate and offspring? Furthermore, how does his wealth and skill 
affect these decisions?   
A hunter deciding whether to invest his resources into gaining access to additional 
mates or investing them in his current mate and offspring is an example of a tradeoff. 
These two choices are not mutually exclusive. A hunter is likely to distribute some of the 
meat or fish he acquired, and keep the rest. A hunter may also spend more time acquiring 
knowledge, skills, and material wealth, and, in doing so, foregoes investing this time and 
his resources in producing offspring. Rather than invest his resources in current offspring, 
he is choosing to invest his resources in future offspring.  
Borgerhoff-Mulder (2000) examines life history traits as tradeoffs of quantity-
quality of offspring and current versus future reproduction decisions among the Kipsigis. 
Borgerhoff-Mulder found the women among the Kipsigis were producing an optimal 
number of children, but the men were producing a suboptimal number of offspring. 
Women were making decisions in the quantity-quality tradeoff of offspring that lead to 
them gaining optimal fitness. They were more likely to increase fitness gains across 
generations by having fewer children and enhancing their quality. In order to gain 
optimal fitness, the men were more inclined to have more children, and were more 
interested in investing in reproductive efforts.  
Several explanations have been summarized by Smith (2004) for the correlation 
between an individual’s hunting success and reproductive success. Direct provisioning of 
wives and children enhances offspring survivorship and spousal fertility. This is an 
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example of the reproductive-versus-parenting tradeoff. Rather than invest the meat they 
catch in gaining potential access to additional mates by sharing the food with individuals 
outside of the household, they choose instead to provision their current spouse. Another 
explanation for this correlation is dyadic reciprocity, where hunter’s exchange meat for 
direct access for mates. Indirect reciprocity is delayed and comes from multiple 
individuals, usually in the form of reputation building. Costly signaling acts on the hunter 
using his hunting skill to broadcast the signal that he is a superior mate.  
Food Sharing 
Food sharing occurs universally among hunter-gatherers and the study of this 
behavioral trait opens a window for researchers to understand the evolution of 
cooperation. Although primate species do participate in food sharing outside of 
provisioning of offspring (Jaeggi and Van Schaick, 2011), hinting at a primate origin for 
the behavior, humans are unique in the extent of their food sharing activities. Jaeggi and 
Gurven (2013) document fifteen species of primates with male-to-female food transfers, 
and conduct a meta-analysis of primate and human food sharing. A similar degree of 
contingency was found across primates and humans controlling for a number of other 
variables (Jaeggi and Gurven, 2013).  Explaining the evolution of cooperative behaviors 
is difficult, and often raises more questions regarding the role and mechanisms of natural 
selection. Cooperative behaviors such as food sharing may help to increase the fitness of 
the recipients, but at a possible risk of lowered fitness to the donor. So how would such 
traits be selected for? Multiple models have been proposed to explain the evolution of 
food sharing among humans. The four discussed here are kin selection, reciprocal 
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altruism, costly signaling and tolerated scrounging. These four have been subject to much 
debate in the last two decades in human behavioral ecology.  
Kin Selection 
Kin selection is often proposed as an explanation for altruistic or cooperative 
behavior. Natural selection supports strategies that favor the success of kin, and possibly 
at the cost of the individual’s own reproductive success. Individuals are expected to share 
with kin above non-kin. Hamilton’s rule (1964) states that only when the benefit (B) 
gained and relatedness factor (r) between the two individuals combined outweigh the cost 
(C) of the action will a transfer occur (C < B*r). The general premise of kin selection is 
that because kin share some genes, fitness might be gained by an individual when its kin 
reproduce, even if the individual does not. Therefore, altruistic acts benefiting one’s kin 
might indirectly benefit oneself, in terms of fitness. Two related individuals, for example, 
siblings. have the probability of sharing 50% of their alleles. If one individual incurs a 
cost that might inhibit their reproductive success, but benefits their siblings’ reproductive 
success, there is a likelihood the trait that prompted the first sibling would also exist in, 
and be passed down through, the second individual. In other words, altruistic traits may 
be selected through the benefit to kin. Kin selection in food-sharing proposes that 
individuals will be more willing to share with those who are more closely related by 
Wright’s coefficient of relatedness r (Kaplan and Gurven, 2001). 
Reciprocal Altruism 
An individual may choose to perform an altruistic act by imposing a cost to his or 
her self to benefit another individual. Trivers (1971) first described how altruistic 
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behaviors might evolve among unrelated individuals. He uses the example of a drowning 
man. There is little incentive to save the man, especially with potentially great cost (such 
as death, in this case). So why would someone choose to save the man? If an individual is 
at as much of risk of drowning in the future, and the risks of drowning can be mitigated 
by being saved by another individual, then altruism might be selected for.  
Reciprocal altruism in food sharing requires that the donor bears a cost that 
benefits another, and that the recipient of the altruistic act receives a benefit that is higher 
than the costs. Food shared reciprocally should be contingent on previous transfers. 
Reciprocal altruism is more likely to occur when food procured is in large, asynchronous 
packages (Kaplan and Hill, 1985), based on the law of diminishing returns. The first 
portion an individual acquires is of more value than the second portion, which is of more 
value to the individual than the third, and this continues on for every subsequent portion. 
A large package is composed of many portions, so when an individual has consumed 
their third portion of the package, the value of the fourth, unconsumed portion is greater 
to another individual, because it is their first portion. The portion is of less value to the 
individual who acquired the packaged than it is to the individual who hasn’t consumed 
any portions. The individual performing the altruistic behavior must receive a benefit 
from the original recipient of the altruistic act in order for cooperation to evolve via this 
evolutionary mechanism.  
Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) modeled several strategies submitted by numerous 
colleagues in a computer tournament of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and concluded that the 
tit-for-tat strategy was the best strategy. Subsequent studies of the iterated game have 
found different strategies serve the individuals playing better than basic tit-for-tat. The 
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basic Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game constructed around a two-by-two matrix. Two 
players may choose to cooperate and receive a benefit, or cheat and secure an even 
greater benefit while imposing a cost on the other. However, if both individuals cheat, 
then they both incur a cost. The tit-for-tat strategy involves going into a situation like the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma with good faith by cooperating on the first move, and then copying 
the other player’s behavior for every subsequent move. This strategy is based in 
reciprocity.  
Costly Signaling 
Costly signaling (Zahavi, 1975; Grafen, 1990) hypothesized that an individual 
shares food to broadcast a signal that they are a superior mate or ally. In this respect, 
cooperative behavior evolved as the cost associated with individual signaling behavior. In 
order for costly signaling to explain food sharing, four conditions need to be present. The 
first of these is that the signals must carry honest and reliable information that address 
variation in the quality of the trait being advertised (Smith and Bliege Bird, 2000). The 
second is that the signal imposes a cost relative to the quality being advertised on the 
individual signaling. Finally, the signal must benefit both the signaler and the receiver. 
The marginal costs of sending the signal relative to the marginal benefit ensure the 
signal’s honest. Recipients of the signal will repay the signaler back, although not in 
ways similar to reciprocity. Signalers will receive more intangible benefits – they may 
find increased access to mates and allies, rather than reciprocity in goods or food. 
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Tolerated Scrounging 
Tolerated scrounging has been proposed as an alternative to kin selection and 
reciprocal altruism. Tolerated scrounging is a simpler theory, and occurs when an 
individual with food realizes the cost of defending the food is greater than the cost of 
giving it up to encroachers. Generally, as the marginal value of a food package decreases 
to the hunter, the more likely they are to give up portions of food to those who ask or 
demand (Blurton Jones, 1987). Tolerated scrounging is expected to occur with large, 
asynchronous packages. Again, if the individual who procured the package has consumed 
the first (or more) portion of the package, the second portion is of less value to that 
individual, but may be of greater value to another, second individual. If the second 
individual pressures the first to give up a portion of the package, the value of that portion 
may be low enough that the first individual decides defending the portion is too great. 
The second individual may realize the value of the first portion is great enough to initiate 
conflict/other costs on the first individual. The costs imposed on the hunter can be 
physical (through violence) or social.  
Ethnographic Background 
The data used for this research was collected from the village of Ust’-Avam by 
Dr. John Ziker of the Boise State Department of Anthropology. Ziker visited Siberia over 
a series of several field trips from the year 1994, with his last trip occurring in 2007, 
spending a total of 36 months in this community.  
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Geography 
Located in the Taimyr region of central Siberia, Ust’-Avam lies at 71° North 
latitude. The village is located along the Avam River, at 71° 07’ N and 92° 49’ E, on the 
Taimyr Peninsula in Central Siberia. The Avam River flows out of the Putoran Plateau 
north into the Dudypta River, shown on Figure 1, which then flows into the Piasina 
River. The winters are long and cold, and the summers are short and mild (Ziker, 2002). 
Ziker writes the area is in close proximity to a forest of Daur’s larch, which extends 
across the lowlands and surrounds the village. There are multiple lakes in the area.  
The growing season is very short – only five or six weeks as recorded by Ziker. 
Native to the area are caribou and several types of fish, which include sturgeon, burbot, 
and whitefish, all of which are sought prey items. Geese and rock ptarmigans can also be 
hunted. Moose are uncommon in the area and rarely hunted, as are musk oxen.  
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Figure 1. Map of Ust Avam 
The village’s remoteness inflates travel costs, making it difficult to travel to or 
from the community. Travel is either by helicopter, boat, or snowmobile. The Dudpyta 
and Avam Rivers act as the main source of travel in the summer.  
History 
Before the 17th century, the native peoples of the Taimyr had little contact with 
outsiders and were left alone to be fairly independent. Over the next few centuries, they 
experienced increasing exposure to outside powers, especially the Russian empire, which 
demanded tributes to be paid in furs. After the revolution in 1917, their settlement pattern 
changed little, but they became more integrated with the greater Soviet economy. By 
1938, though, there were five collectives in the Avam area, and the Soviet government 
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had collectivized most of the domestic reindeer. In 1971, the community of Ust’-Avam 
was created. Ust’-Avam sat on ten million hectares set aside to create a new 
administrative hunting district, “Taimyrskii,” which focused on commercial hunting, 
trapping, and fishing. At this point, community members became fully integrated in the 
Soviet planned economy and were paid decent monthly salaries for a variety of jobs 
including staff hunter, seamstress, stove stoker, janitor, etc. Villagers received wages and 
pensions like all other workers in the Soviet Union. In addition, all domestic reindeer 
were slaughtered by 1978 and the community became fully dependent on combustion-
powered transportation. Since the Dolgan and Nganasan lost much of their traditional 
autonomy and became dependent on outside sources of equipment, fuel, and cash, the 
community was very negatively affected by the collapse of the USSR. The importance of 
traditional subsistence activities has been emphasized with the decentralization of the 
Russian government since the fall of the Soviet Union (Ziker, 2002). Since the early 
1990s, few jobs are salaried and those are reserved for a select few. The costs of fuel and 
equipment increased drastically so Ust’-Avam hunters give more emphasis to hunting 
and fishing for subsistence rather than commercial sales. In addition, traditional modes of 
hunting and gathering, such as game trapping, became more widespread.  
Ust’-Avam 
The community consists of 177 households and 670 individuals (Ziker and 
Schnegg, 2005). The Dolgan and Nganasan are the two largest ethnicities in the village. 
The Dolgan number close to 6,000 people (Ziker, 2002), and traditionally herded 
domestic reindeer, hunted caribou, trapped and fished. There are approximately 1,000 
Nganasan, and traditionally they hunted caribou and used reindeer for transportation. 
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They also trapped and fished. Both were traditionally semi-nomadic. After the 
establishment of the Government Hunting Enterprise Taimyrski alongside the permanent 
village in 1971, the state provided snowmobiles, rifles, and ammunition for hunting. In 
the 1990s and early-to-mid 2000s, as such goods became costly and most hunters were no 
longer receiving a wage, snowmobiles and other equipment were found to be aging and 
failing. Many hunters were focusing more on local prey as travel costs increased. In 
1996, a few hunters were able to sell their game for cash. However, cash income remains 
rare.  
In the growing season, women and children will collect what mushrooms and 
berries they can gather (Ziker, 2002). Caribou are hunted in late fall and early spring at 
river crossings, and during the summer, fall, and winter on land. Geese are hunted in the 
spring and the summer. Fishing occurs year-round, with ice-net fishing in the winter, 
open-water net-fishing and seine fishing in the summer, and thin-ice fishing in the spring. 
Arctic fox trapping occurs in the winter, but can be costly due to transportation 
requirements of checking long trap lines.  
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CHAPTER TWO: RECIPROCITY, KINSHIP, SKILL, AND GENEROSITY  
EXPLAIN INTER-HOUSEHOLD FOOD TRANSFERS IN A SIBERIAN HUNTER-
GATHERER COMMUNITY 
In the community of Ust’-Avam, the fall of the Soviet Union decreased the 
amount of outside resources available to the people. An increased reliance on traditional 
modes of subsistence – hunting, trapping and fishing – was noted by Ziker in his visits to 
the area (Ziker, 2002; Ziker, 2003; Ziker and Schnegg, 2005). Food sharing is pervasive 
in hunter-gatherer societies, and is seen in Ust’-Avam. Hunters share the meat they hunt 
in the community with kin, neighbors, friends, and acquaintances. What determines with 
whom a hunter will share with? This chapter seeks to predict variation in inter-household 
sharing between donor, hunter households, and recipient households. In order to do so, 
several variables are examined. Household characteristics of hunting skill and material 
wealth, previous transfers of meat or other items and services, and inter-household 
relatedness to kin are all analyzed. In this chapter, I outline the methods used to conduct 
these analyses and their results. This outline includes descriptions of each variable and 
the procedures used. Finally, I summarize the conclusions these results point to. 
Methods 
Foraging excursions were documented in 2001 and 2003. Thirty-six hunters went 
on 77 excursions, representing 100% of the total foraging excursions during this time as 
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noted by Ziker (M.S. 2013). The variables examined were collected in 1997, 2001, and 
2003, and some in 2007. 
Dependent Variable 
What best predicts food sharing in Ust’-Avam? To answer this question, the 
frequency of transfers occurring between households was analyzed using several 
independent variables. These transfers occurred after 77 hunting excursions involving 36 
hunters. Ziker recorded the amount of meat and fish acquired, and the amounts consumed 
or distributed for all 77 excursions. In order to examine dyadic relationships between 
households, a matrix regression analysis is used. Each variable is entered into a 177x177 
matrix. The 177x177 matrix consists of all pairs of households in the community, with 
donor households represented by row and recipient households represented by column. 
To create the frequency of transfers matrix, the number of transfers occurring from the 
donor household to the recipient household is entered as the value of the matrix cell. For 
this example, please refer to Table 2.1. If household A gave food once to household B, 
the value in cell 2 would be 1. If household B never reciprocated, the value in cell 2 
would be 0. Two hundred and four sharing events were analyzed between 36 donor 
households and 102 recipient households, though all households participated in the study. 
Non-hunted food sharing events were not recorded in this study, so the 36 donor 
households are solely hunters. Cell 1 represents sharing occurring between household A, 
with household A, and cell 4 represents sharing occurring within household B. Since no 
inter-household sharing is occurring, the values for these cells remain blank. 
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Table 2.1 Example of matrix used for frequency of transfers 
 A B 
A [cell 1] [cell 2] 1 
B [cell 3] 0 [cell 4]  
Independent Variables 
Maximum Genealogical Relatedness 
Does kinship best predict inter-household transfers? In order to analyze the 
frequency of transfers with kinship, genealogical relatedness needed to be calculated for 
each household. For a pair of households, the genealogical relatedness for each individual 
in one household was determined in relation to all other individuals in the other 
household. The coefficient of relatedness was derived using the DESCENT program 
(Hagen, 2005). Ziker collected extensive genealogies in the community, reaching several 
generations into the past. The genealogical data was last updated in 2007. The max r 
value (coefficient of genealogical relatedness) was used to express the total household 
relatedness between the pair. For example, if household A had three members, one of 
whom was the sibling of a member of household B, which had two members, and this 
was the strongest tie, then the max genealogical relatedness value would be 0.5 as 
described in Figure 2. The value of the cell conjoining households A and B in the max 
genealogical relatedness matrix would also be 0.5. 
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Figure 2. Fictitious diagram illustrating coefficients of relatedness between 
members of two households. The maximum relatedness is r = 0.5, whereas the 
average would be r = 0.1875. 
Sum of Maximum Hunter Skill 
In 2003, Ziker asked nine informants to rate all of the hunters in the community 
on a 3-point scale by skill level. Five of these informants evaluated 56 men in common.  
However, not all informants provided ratings for all hunters. These five evaluators 
provided a sample of rated hunters with which to act as a control for the other hunters 
with fewer evaluations. A Cronbach’s alpha is a coefficient of internal consistency and is 
used to test the reliability of a scale (Cronbach, 1951). If the separate factors of a scale 
are correlated together, the Alpha score will be higher (Tavakol and Dennick, 2011). The 
scale in question here is composed of the scores of these five informants. The Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient of 0.825 indicates high scale inter-reliability. Missing ratings for hunters 
were imputed with the average rating provided by the missing evaluator. If an individual 
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evaluator was biased towards rating hunters higher or lower than other evaluators, then 
the imputed ratings for that evaluator would reflect this bias consistently across all 
hunters. In order to check that imputing ratings were still valid, the imputed ratings were 
summed and, along with the summed un-imputed ratings, linearly regressed against age-
adjusted reproductive success (See Chapter 3). The results were similar and justify using 
the larger dataset (imputed hunter skill evaluations: adj. R2 = 0.101, F1, 140 = 16.824, β = 
0.328, t = 4.102, p = 0.000; non-imputed hunter skill evaluations: adj. R2 = 0.124, F1, 55 = 
8.872, β = 0.374, t = 2.963, p = 0.005). The independent variables representing dyadic 
skill relationships use the maximum hunter skill evaluation for each household in cases 
where there were two or more hunters in a household. The summed values of the hunter 
skill evaluations of an inter-household dyad are used to create the sum of max hunter skill 
matrix.  
Sum of Maximum Hunter Wealth 
Each hunter was assigned a wealth value on a scale of 0 - 5. This value was 
determined by the ownership of any of the following four items in the year 2003: 
snowmobile, boat motor, rifle, and shotgun; and by the occupation of a hunting territory 
in 1997, 2003, or 2007. A Mokken scaling analysis, performed in R, was used to 
determine the validity of creating a scale from these five items. A Mokken analysis is 
similar to a Guttman’s scaling analysis, and is used to construct and determine the 
validity of a scale of dichotomous variables (Van der Ark, 2007). A Loevinger’s h greater 
than 0.5 indicates high scale inter-reliability, and for this scale h = 0.672 (p = 0.048). 
These values created a material wealth scale for which all hunters were assigned a value. 
The maximum material wealth figure for each household was selected in the case of more 
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than one hunter in a household, and these values were summed in a 177x177 matrix – 
that is, the highest material wealth value was summed for each inter-household dyad. 
Difference of Maximum Hunter Skill 
The sum of maximum hunter skill evaluations variable is a matrix of the sums of 
hunter skill in an inter-household dyad, as discussed above. Here, instead of summing the 
two hunter skill evaluations in a household pair, a matrix was constructed by finding the 
difference between the skill evaluations of each pair of households. The recipient skill 
rating was subtracted from the donor skill rating. I plan to capture differences in producer 
ability with this variable.  
Difference of Maximum Hunter Wealth 
The sum of maximum hunter wealth variable is a matrix of the sums of the 
material wealth ratings in an inter-household dyad, as I discussed previously. In order to 
measure differences in wealth, the differences (as opposed to the sums) of the ratings 
between households are found and entered into a matrix. The recipient hunter wealth 
scale was subtracted from the donor hunter wealth scale. I plan to capture differences in 
hunting reputation with this variable. 
Frequency of Transfers Transposed 
The frequency of transfers transposed variable represents reciprocal transfers. 
This matrix is created by flipping the frequency of transfers matrix so that rows no longer 
represent donor households but rather recipient households, and columns no longer 
represent recipient households but donor households instead. Recall the example used 
above with Table 2.1. The value for cell 2 is 1, because household A had given once to 
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household B. If the matrix is transposed, the value for cell 2 is 0, because B never gave to 
household A. The value for cell 3 becomes 1. The other two cells remain undefined. 
When frequency of transfers is regressed with frequency of transfers transposed as the 
independent variable, results indicate the level of reciprocity occurring in inter-household 
transfers, that is, the correlation of B’s giving to A with A’s giving to B. 
Frequency of Receiving 
Each sharing event that occurred from the 77 hunts in field visits by Ziker in 2001 
and 2003 was coded into two separate dummy variables, obligatory sharing and voluntary 
sharing. The interviewee (donor) was asked three questions.  
1) Why did you share?  
2) What did you get out of sharing?  
3) Did the recipient ever give you bush food or anything else? 
If the answers indicated that the interviewee felt obligated to give meat or fish in 
some way, then the obligatory variable was coded with a 1. If the interviewee did not feel 
obligated to give food, then the obligatory variable was coded with a 0. If the interviewee 
had voluntarily shared and felt no expectation to share, the voluntary variable was coded 
with a 1. If the sharing event indicated the interviewee had shared because he felt 
obligated, or for reasons other than voluntarily sharing, then the voluntary variable was 
coded with a 0. If no sharing event occurred, then the value was left blank. Sometimes 
multiple sharing events occurred in a single dyad, in which case the maximum value of 
the variable was used. A transposed matrix of each of these variables was created, 
indicating that for the first case, the recipient had given to the hunter something the 
hunter would feel obligated to reciprocate in meat or fish (for example, the recipient lent 
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him a rifle or boat motor), and for the second case, indicating that the recipient had given 
to the hunter something the hunter would not feel obligated to reciprocate (for example, 
tea). These two matrices were summed, indicating any sort of sharing with the hunter 
prior to the hunt that may have occurred in a different ‘currency.’ 
Procedure 
Multiple-Regression Quadratic Assignment Procedure (MRQAP) performed by 
UCINET 6.0 was used to analyze these matrices. QAP is used in cases where the data 
violate the assumption of independence (Krackhardt, 1988). The QAP ‘scrambles’ the 
dependent matrix by using the same permutation for rows and for columns. Several 
hundred permutations of the dependent matrix result in a sampling distribution to use as 
the null hypothesis. The original dependent matrix and the permuted matrix are both 
regressed with the independent matrix.  
If the regression coefficients (or R2) from the original matrix are in the extreme 
percentile of the distribution of coefficients (or R2) produced by the permuted matrices, 
the null hypothesis can be rejected.  
Results 
Seven variables were entered individually using the MRQAP routine in UCINET 
to predict the frequency of transfers between households. Each variable is listed in Table 
2.1, along with their results, which include the significance as a variable, the significance 
of the total model, and the variance (R2) explained by that model. Max genealogical 
relatedness (β = 0.33654, p = 0.00050), the sum of max hunter skill (β = 0.09709, p = 
0.00050), frequencies transposed (β = 0.44291, p = 0.00050), and frequency of receiving 
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(β = 0.25977, p = 0.00050) are significant as variables. The frequency of receiving 
variable when individually entered is not significant, although it approaches significance. 
So, while frequency of receiving may have a significant effect on the frequency of 
transfers, the variance it explains is not large enough to be significant at the model level.  
Table 2.2 Individually entered variables predicting frequency of transfers 
Variable Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Standardized 
coefficient 
Variable 
significance 
(p) 
Model 
R2 
Model 
significance 
(p) 
Max 
genealogical 
relatedness 
1.76707 0.33654 0.00050*** 0.113 0.002** 
Sum of max 
hunter wealth 
0.01955 0.06432 0.00550** 0.004 0.119 
Sum of max 
hunter skill 
0.00738 0.09709 0.00050*** 0.009 0.015* 
Difference of 
max hunter 
wealth 
0.00059 0.00360 0.48577 0.000 0.486 
Difference of 
max hunter 
skill 
-0.00120 -0.01498 0.25837 0.000 0.368 
Frequencies 
transposed 
0.44291 0.44291 0.00050*** 0.196 0.046* 
Frequency of 
receiving 
0.92465 0.25977 0.00050*** 0.067 0.063† 
  *     = p<0.050 
  **   = p<0.010 
  *** = p<0.001 
  †     = almost significant 
 
Table 2.2 shows the results of entering the three main effects, determined from 
the individually entered variables, to predict the frequency of transfers. The three 
variables acting as main effects are genealogical relatedness, sum of max hunter skill, and 
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frequencies transposed (which represents reciprocity). When entered together, each 
variable remains significant. The model is significant, and the R2 is 0.276, resulting in 
almost 28% of the variance in frequency of transfers explained by these three variables.  
Table 2.3 Main effects model predicting frequency of transfers 
Variable Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Standardized 
coefficient 
Variable 
significance 
(p) 
Model 
R2 
Model 
significance 
(p) 
Max 
genealogical 
relatedness 
2.20274 0.30247 0.00050*** 0.276 0.041* 
Sum of max 
hunter skill 
0.01269 0.06682 0.00900** 
Frequencies 
transposed 
0.30031 0.30031 0.00050*** 
  *     = p<0.050 
  **   = p<0.010 
  *** = p<0.001 
  †     = almost significant 
 
Is there any variance that is not explained by these variables individually, but 
might be explained by some interaction of these variables? In order to answer this 
question, three interaction terms were created. The first, max genealogical relatedness • 
sum of max hunter skill, was created by multiplying the corresponding cell values of 
these two matrices. The second, created in the same way as the first, was max 
genealogical relatedness • frequencies transposed. The final interaction term was created 
by multiplying the sum of max hunter skill • frequencies transposed. The main effects 
need to remain in the model in order to act as controls for the interaction terms. Table 2.3 
illustrates the results. The model R2 has increased to 0.396 (p = 0.033). However, max 
genealogical relatedness, sum of max hunter skill, and max genealogical relatedness • 
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sum of max hunter skill, are no longer significant. Furthermore, the sign on the 
coefficient of frequencies transposed has moved from positive to negative (β = -1.33925, 
p = 0.00050), indicating an increase in sharing with households who do not reciprocate, 
after controlling for a propensity to share with relatives and other skilled hunters who 
reciprocate. It is important to note that the max genealogical relatedness • sum of max 
hunter skill variable approaches significance (β = 0.20246, p = 0.06697). 
Table 2.4 Main effects and interaction terms model predicting frequency of 
transfers 
Variable Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Standardized 
coefficient 
Variable 
significance 
(p) 
Model 
R2 
Model 
significance 
(p) 
Max 
genealogical 
relatedness 
0.48986 0.06727 0.26687 0.396 0.033* 
Sum of max 
hunter skill 
0.00226 0.01191 0.35032 
Frequencies 
transposed 
-1.33925 -1.33925 0.00050*** 
Max 
genealogical 
relatedness 
•Sum of max 
hunter skill 
0.07465 0.20246 0.06697 † 
Max 
genealogical 
relatedness • 
Frequencies 
transposed 
0.31763 0.12287 0.02549* 
Sum of max 
hunter skill 
•Frequencies 
transposed 
0.07211 1.57269 0.00050*** 
  *     = p<0.050 
  **   = p<0.010 
  *** = p<0.001 
  †     = almost significant 
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Is there a more parsimonious model? The decision to remove the interaction term 
max genealogical relatedness •sum of max hunter skill only slightly affected the overall 
R2 of the model, and did not affect its significance. Of some interest is that max 
genealogical relatedness is again significant in the final model (β = 0.25578, p =0.00050). 
It is important to note here that the sign on the coefficient of frequencies transposed 
remains negative. 
Table 2.5 Final model predicting frequency of transfers 
Variable Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Standardized 
coefficient 
Variable 
significance 
(p) 
Model 
R2 
Model 
significance 
(p) 
Max 
genealogical 
relatedness 
1.86272 0.25578 0.00050*** 0.395 0.033* 
Sum of max 
hunter skill 
0.00362 0.01904 0.28486 
Frequencies 
transposed 
-1.43521 -1.43521 0.00050*** 
Max 
genealogical 
relatedness • 
Frequencies 
transposed 
0.32785 0.12682 0.01949* 
Sum of max 
hunter skill 
•Frequencies 
transposed 
0.07718 1.68334 0.00050*** 
  *     = p<0.050 
  **   = p<0.010 
  *** = p<0.001 
  †     = almost significant 
 
Does reciprocity occur in other currencies? To answer this question, the frequency 
of receiving variable is included with the other variables of the previous model. Recall 
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that this variable is significant when individually entered to predict the frequency of 
transfers. The results in Table 2.5 indicate that the frequency of receiving is not a 
significant predictor of the frequency of transfers in this exploratory model, indicating 
that most of the variance explained by this variable is also explained by other variables. 
The model R2 remains mostly unchanged (though the significance of the model does 
slightly increase (p = 0.037)). When combined with other variables, possibly frequencies 
transposed, frequency of receiving does not predict frequency of transfers, indicating that 
reciprocity does not occur in other currencies significantly enough to predict food 
transfers.  
Table 2.6 Model exploring the possible effects of reciprocity in other currencies 
in predicting frequency of transfers 
Variable Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Standardized 
coefficient 
Variable 
significance 
(p) 
Model 
R2 
Model 
significance 
(p) 
Max 
genealogical 
relatedness 
1.81726 0.24954 0.00050*** 0.396 0.037* 
Sum of max 
hunter skill 
0.00340 0.01792 0.29185 
Frequencies 
transposed 
-1.45635 -1.45635 0.00050*** 
Max 
genealogical 
relatedness 
•Sum of max 
hunter skill 
0.37359 0.14452 0.01599* 
Max 
genealogical 
relatedness • 
Frequencies 
transposed 
0.07665 1.67159 0.00050*** 
Frequency of 
receiving 
0.12498 0.03511 0.10945 
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  *     = p<0.050 
  **   = p<0.010 
  *** = p<0.001 
  †     = almost significant 
 
Conclusions 
The best model to predict variations in food transfer frequencies includes kinship, 
reciprocity, and household hunting skill. Hunting skill only predicts transfers when 
included with other variables controlling for the interaction terms, and is not significant. 
The results from the final model support this conclusion, and also show that this variation 
is not explained by these three variables alone, but also relies on an amount of interaction 
between hunter skill and reciprocity, and kinship and reciprocity. This final model, which 
includes the main effects and these two interaction terms, explains almost 40% of the 
variance in inter-household food transfers. Aside from the findings of this final model, 
the results show several other conclusions. 
First, the model (Figure 2.5) shows transfers increase in frequency as inter-
household relatedness increases, with a standard coefficient (β) of 0.25578 (p = 0.00050), 
controlling for reciprocity, skill, and interaction terms. This result supports the kin 
provisioning hypothesis discussed in Chapter 1. Second, increases in frequency of 
transfers, when controlled for kinship and skill and the interaction terms, result in 
significant decreases in reciprocal transfers, showing a shift from contingency to 
unidirectional transfers (β = -1.43521). Unidirectional transfers may indicate distribution 
of food from those that have to those who are needy. This has been termed “generosity 
signaling” (Gurven et al, 2000). Lastly, I tested to see if these transfers were truly 
generous, or if reciprocation was occurring in another currency. Recall the frequency of 
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receiving variable, which was significant when entered individually to predict frequency 
of transfers. This indicates that reciprocity is occurring in the community in other 
currencies, but the model was not significant, and the variable was not significant when 
added to the final model. I conclude that while reciprocity does occur in other currencies, 
it does not significantly predict the frequency of transfers and that these transfers are truly 
generous – they are not reciprocated.  
Third, reciprocity occurs between highly skilled households, as noted by the 
significance of the interaction term sum of skills • frequency of transfers (β = 1.68334, p 
= 0.00050), independent of kinship, generous transfers, and the interaction between 
kinship and reciprocity. Fourth, reciprocity also occurs between related households (β = 
0.03560, p = 0.00050), independent of the interaction of skill and reciprocal transfers, 
kinship, skill, and generous transfers. Recent studies have also illustrated an interaction 
with kinship and reciprocity (e.g., Nolin, 2010). I will expand on these in Chapter 4.  
Hunters with higher producer capacity do not give more frequently to those with 
lower capacities, and choose instead to share with those who are more likely to 
reciprocate, as represented by the strength of the interaction term between sum of skill 
and frequency of transfers transposed. The variable representing the household 
differences in hunter skill was not a significant predictor of food sharing frequency 
individually or in combination with other variables. These findings do not support the 
costly signaling hypothesis described in Chapter 1. Furthermore, hunters with higher 
material wealth do not share more frequently with those of lesser wealth. The variable 
representing the household differences in hunter wealth was also not a significant 
predictor of food sharing frequency individually or in combination with other variables. 
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This result does not provide support for the hypothesis of tolerated scrounging. In this 
community, there are instances where an individual will ask a donor for meat, and can be 
quite insistent (Ziker, p.c. 2013). These instances were rare enough that they were not 
significant predictors of food sharing. Food sharing is a very important aspect of life in 
the community, and not sharing can lead to gossip and a reputation of stinginess (Ziker, 
2003). This anecdotal evidence supports the idea that tolerated scrounging may be at 
work within the community, however it may not be significant enough to explain 
variation.  
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CHAPTER THREE: MALE REPRODUCTIVE SUCCESS AND FORMS OF WEALTH 
IN NORTHERN SIBERIA 
Research in the community of Ust’-Avam, following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, can provide insight into individuals’ decisions in an environment of change. As 
the members of this community move away from a commercial hunting economy 
towards a more traditional, subsistence economy, questions central to the HBE field are 
asked here. What best explains these hunters’ reproductive success? How do different 
types of wealth affect this success, and how well do they predict when a hunter will start 
his reproductive career? This section looks to answer the broader question of what men 
do with the resources they choose to keep in light of life-history tradeoffs concerning 
seeking new mates and potential future offspring, or provisioning current mates and 
offspring.  
This study examines how men invest their resources by their types of wealth as 
related to hunting and their subsequent reproductive success, in hopes of determining 
how they make the decision to invest in reproduction or in mating effort. In this chapter, I 
will outline the methods used to answer these questions. I will then describe the results 
from these analyses, and finally, I will discuss these results and their implications, and 
the conclusions I have drawn from them.  
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Methods 
What best predicts variation in men’s reproductive success and when they will 
reproduce? The sample includes all 272 men 15 years of age and over in the Ust’-Avam 
community. In order to answer this question, age adjusted reproductive success (RS) and 
age at first birth are regressed against three classes of wealth determined by nine separate 
variables.  These are the same three wealth classes described by Smith et al. (2010) and 
are material, embodied, and relational wealth.  Embodied wealth includes such 
intangibles as education, skills, and health. Material wealth is the ownership of physical, 
tangible property, and the most easily measured. The number and quality of social 
relations determines social capital or, as it’s called in this study, relational wealth.  
Dependent Variables 
What best predicts men’s reproductive success? To answer this question, 
reproductive success needs to be defined and quantified. Here, reproductive success only 
includes children survived to age 5 at census (2007). Age is controlled for by using the 
residuals of the number of children survived to age 5 with age and age2 as predictors. Age 
is determined by age at census (2007). Age-adjusted RS is used as the dependent variable 
in linear regressions and using this variable serves to control for the very strong 
correlation between age and reproductive success, allowing the RS of men of different 
ages to be compared.  
When will men begin to reproduce? Age at first birth is the age of the man at the 
birth of his first recorded child, had he experienced such an event. If he had not, then his 
age at census (2007) is included. The event was coded for true or not (1 or 0). Predicting 
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age at first birth requires a hazard-function analysis rather than a linear regression, the 
Cox regression is a hazard-function analysis provided by SPSS.  
Independent Variables 
Three classes of wealth are tested in this analysis: embodied, material, and 
relational. Embodied wealth can often include skills, education, and health statistics such 
as BMI. Here, I used the education level recorded in the census, and the hunter skill 
evaluation scale as described in Chapter 2. The variables used to describe material wealth 
include the material wealth scale also described in Chapter 2, and the amount of cash 
income recorded in a survey conducted among a sub-sample of hunters in 1997. There 
are few cases for this variable. Relational wealth is generally defined with variables that 
act as proxy for the strength of an individual’s social network. In this case, I use the count 
of parents, the count of siblings, the count of parents’ siblings, and the count of parents’ 
siblings’ offspring. These four variables were provided from Ziker’s extensive 
genealogical data updated in 2007 inputted into the program Descent (Hagen, 2005). I 
have included an additional measure of relational wealth in the form of a formal hunting 
status. Each individual was scored on a scale of 1 to 5 (staff hunter, brigade hunter, 
amateur, etc.) as an indicator of social relations. I have inverted this scale to use in 
regressions. 
Results 
Age-Adjusted Reproductive Success 
Each of the nine variables was entered individually in both linear and Cox 
regressions. First, each variable was regressed against age-adjusted reproductive success. 
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Then, each variable was entered individually in a Cox regression to determine their effect 
on age at first birth. Each variable representing embodied wealth was individually 
regressed against age-adjusted reproductive success using SPSS. Bootstrapping was used 
in order to control for known interdependence in the data, and leads to conservative t-test 
results. Of the two, only the hunter skill evaluations variable was significant (β = 0.328, p 
= 0.000). Table 3.1 illustrates these results.  
Table 3.1 Age-adjusted RS: Embodied variables - individually entered 
Covariate N Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Standard 
error1 
Standardized 
coefficient 
Significance2 
(p) 
Hunter skill 
evaluations 
142 0.193 0.061 0.328 0.000** 
Education 
level 
240 0.051 0.044 0.084 0.196 
1 Robust bootstrapped standard errors, 2 T-test significance, * Significant at p<0.05, ** 
Significant at p<0.01, † Approaching significance 
 
Figure 2 illustrates a linear-regression plot with age-adjusted RS as the dependent 
variable, and hunter skill evaluations as the independent variable. Hunter skill evaluations 
were the only significant predictor representing embodied wealth of hunter’s RS. The 
blue line indicates the line of best fit and the red lines represent the 95% confidence 
interval. The R2 value of 0.107 indicates hunter-skill evaluations explain ten percent of 
the variation in men’s age-adjusted reproductive success. Few of the 142 evaluations fall 
outside the lines of the confidence interval, and the data points show a definitive, positive 
trend, though there appears to be a cluster towards lower skill evaluation ratings.  
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Figure 3. Linear regression plot: hunter skill evaluations 
 
Next, the two variables representing material wealth, the material wealth scale 
and cash income, were individually entered to determine their effect on age-adjusted 
reproductive success. Only material wealth scale was significant (β = 0.255, p = 0.000) as 
described in Table 3.2. Income is a poor indicator of individual performance as any effect 
it has is very insignificant, it has been removed from the model (β = 0.069, p = 0.7666). 
Income may have such an insignificant effect on determining hunter reproductive success 
because there are only 21 men in the community who reported a cash income. Such a 
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small ‘n’ would alter the results of the final model, further justifying not including this 
variable.  
Table 3.2 Age-adjusted RS: Material variables - individually entered 
Covariate N Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Standard 
error1 
Standardized 
coefficient 
Significance2 
(p) 
Material 
wealth scale 
272 0.221 0.064 0.255 0.000** 
Cash 
income 
21 3.696E-006 1.9E-005 0.069 0.7666 
1 Robust bootstrapped standard errors, 2 T-test significance, * Significant at p<0.05, ** 
Significant at p<0.01, † Approaching significance 
 
Figure 3 is a linear regression plot with age-adjusted RS as the dependent variable 
on the y-axis, and the hunter material wealth scale as the independent variable on the x-
axis. This plot shows the effect material wealth has on age-adjusted RS. With an R2 of 
0.065 indicating over 6% of the variance in reproductive success is explained, this effect 
is significant, recalling Table 3.2. Again, the blue line represents the best fit, and the red 
lines represent the 95% confidence interval. It is important to remember here that the 
material wealth scale is composed of the ownership status of five items, and this is why 
the plot looks striated.   
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Figure 4. Linear regression plot: hunter material wealth 
 
The final set of variables individually entered against age-adjusted RS represented 
embodied wealth. Again, these five variables are number of living parents, number of 
living parents’ siblings, number of living siblings, number of living parents’ siblings’ 
offspring, and formal hunting status as a measure of a hunter’s social network access. The 
results are described in Table 3.3. Only formal hunting status is a significant predictor of 
age-adjusted RS (β = 0.259, p = 0.002). The number of siblings, number of parents, and 
number of parents’ siblings are not significant in the slightest. It should be noted that the 
number of parents’ siblings’ offspring (or the number of the hunter’s full cousins), 
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approaches significance (β = -0.115, p = 0.058). While the significance of this variable 
does not meet the threshold set, it does border it, and the number of full cousins a hunter 
has might have a negative influence on the number of children he has.  
Table 3.3 Age-adjusted RS: Relational variables - individually entered 
Covariate N Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Standard 
error1 
Standardized 
coefficient 
Significance2 
(p) 
Number of 
siblings 
272 -0.011 0.038 -0.017 0.781 
Number of 
parents 
272 -0.012 0.088 -0.007 0.903 
Number of 
parents’ siblings 
272 -0.021 0.025 -0.031 0.610 
Number of 
parents’ siblings’ 
offspring 
272 -0.019 0.006 -0.115 0.058† 
Formal hunting 
status 
138 0.262 0.103 0.259 0.002** 
1 Robust bootstrapped standard errors, 2 T-test significance, * Significant at p<0.05, ** 
Significant at p<0.01, † Approaching significance 
 
All variables (excepting cash income) were entered into a single model using the 
SPSS backwards stepwise procedure to create a final model. The backward stepwise 
procedure begins with all variables, and eliminates variables as the model improves. 
Table 3.4 illustrates these results. Only hunter skill evaluations and material wealth are 
found significant ((β = 0.237, p = 0.014) and (β = 0.210, p = 0.029), respectively). 
Although formal hunting status is found significant when individually entered, the 
variation it explains is not significant enough (or unique enough) to be included in the 
final model; that is, the variation explained by formal hunting status may also be 
explained by the material wealth scale and hunter skill evaluations.  
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Table 3.4 Age-adjusted RS: Final model 
Covariate N Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Standard 
error1 
Standardized 
coefficient 
Significance2 
(p) 
Hunter skill 
evaluations 
133 0.142 0.057 0.237 0.014* 
Material 
wealth 
133 0.175 0.079 0.210 0.029* 
Overall Model fit (R2) = 0.153, F-test significant, p = 0.001 
1 Robust bootstrapped standard errors, 2 T-test significance, * Significant at p<0.05, ** 
Significant at p<0.01, † Approaching significance 
 
Age at First Birth 
In order to determine when a hunter in the community may expect to experience a 
first birth, a Cox regression (or Cox proportional hazards analysis) was performed. Each 
of the nine independent variables was entered individually against the dependent variable 
of age at first birth. Again, these nine variables are grouped into three categories of 
wealth: embodied, material, and relational. First, the relational wealth variables were 
individually entered in a Cox regression. The results are depicted in Table 3.5, and show 
that again, like in the linear regression predicting reproductive success, only hunter skill 
evaluations are significant when predicting age at first birth (Exp(B) = 1.091, p  = 0.045). 
Of note here, though, is that the education level approaches significance (Exp(B) = 1.106, 
p = 0.056). Where education level did not predict the hunter’s reproductive success, it 
could be said it influences the age at first birth. This is interesting because education level 
would not be delaying reproduction as generally expected in post-demographic transition 
societies, but hastening it (note the positive Exp(B) in Table 3.5). Few men leave the 
community for a secondary education, which may explain why education has a positive 
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influence on men’s expected age at first birth: completing 11 years of school in the 
community may be a general indicator of embodied capital, and thus make these men 
more attractive as mates.  If men left the community for secondary education, they would 
likely experience a delay in age at first birth. In post-demographic transition economies, 
individuals delay reproduction to build capital. However, since there are so few 
employment opportunities that require education (and these are often filled by ethnicities 
other than Dolgan or Nganasan), education is not as beneficial to an individual in 
building wealth. 
 
Table 3.5 Age at first birth: Embodied variables - individually entered 
Covariate N B Standard 
error1 
Exp(B) Significance2 (p) 
Hunter skill 
evaluations 
142 0.087 0.035 1.091 0.045* 
Education level 240 0.101 0.053 1.106 0.056† 
1 Robust bootstrapped standard errors, 2 Wald test significance, * Significant at p<0.05, 
** Significant at p<0.01, † Approaching significance 
 
Figure 4 plots the probability of survival until a first birth using a Kaplan-Meier 
plot. The x-axis indicates hunter age minus 15 years (survival of not experiencing a first 
birth is expected to be 1.0 at 15 years old), and the y-axis represents the cumulative 
survival of not experiencing a first birth. The youngest father was just under 16 years old. 
The hunter skill evaluations scale is grouped into three categories; those who scored 
lower than one standard deviation below the mean are poorly skilled, those that scored 
between one standard deviation above and below the mean represent moderate skill level, 
and those that scored higher than one standard deviation above the mean are highly 
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skilled. The plot indicates that highly skilled hunters (the green line) are more likely to 
experience a first birth by the age of 35 than those who are less skilled. Highly skilled 
hunters, if they are going to experience a first birth, do so by the time they are 35, 
whereas moderately skilled hunters will do so by the time they are 55 years old. 
Interestingly, this plot shows that the least skilled hunters are also the least likely to 
experience a first birth.  
 
Figure 5. Kaplan-Meier plot of likelihood of age at first birth by hunter skill 
evaluations 
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Next, the material wealth variables were entered individually to predict age at first 
birth. Again, only the wealth scale was significant (Exp(B) = 1.148, p = 0.012), and cash 
income is very much not significant (Exp(B) = 1.000, p = 0.695). Since cash income is so 
insignificant, and again, because its n is so small (21), it is not included in determining 
the final model.  
Table 3.6 Age at first birth: Material variables - individually entered 
Covariate N B Standard 
error1 
Exp(B) Significance2 (p) 
Material wealth scale 272 0.138 0.046 1.148 0.012* 
Cash income 21 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.695 
1 Robust bootstrapped standard errors, 2 Wald test significance, * Significant at p<0.05, 
** Significant at p<0.01, † Approaching significance 
 
Figure 5 is also a Kaplan-Meier plot. Age minus 15 years is represented on the x-
axis, and cumulative survival to the event (first birth) is plotted along the y-axis. The 
green line is the wealthiest class of hunters, the red is those with moderate or little wealth, 
and the blue line represents hunters with no material wealth. Of interest here is that there 
seems to be little difference between hunters with no wealth and hunters with little 
wealth. Many hunters with little wealth will experience first births earlier than their 
wealthier and poorer counterparts. In any case, hunters with high wealth are more likely 
to experience a first birth, and will do so by the age of 35 or 37.  
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Figure 6. Kaplan-Meier plot of age at first birth by hunter material wealth 
 
Variables representing relational wealth were analyzed to predict age at first birth 
using a Cox regression. These variables were entered individually. Again, these variables 
include counts in four categories of kin, and the formal hunting status as a measure of 
social network access representing relational ties. In predicting age at first birth, only 
formal hunting status is significant (Exp(B) = 1.172, p = 0.043), as described in Table 
3.7. No other category, including number of siblings, number of parents, number of 
parents’ siblings, and number of parents’ siblings’ offspring are significant.  
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Table 3.7 Age at first birth: Relational variables - individually entered 
Covariate N B Standard 
error1 
Exp(B) Significance2 (p) 
Number of siblings 272 -0.089 0.050 0.915 0.106 
Number of parents 272 0.059 0.161 1.061 0.704 
Number of parents’ 
siblings 
272 -0.027 0.080 0.973 0.720 
Number of parents’ 
siblings’ offspring 
272 -0.023 0.021 0.977 0.183 
Formal hunting status 138 0.159 0.072 1.172 0.043* 
1 Robust bootstrapped standard errors, 2 Wald test significance, * Significant at p<0.05, 
** Significant at p<0.01, † Approaching significance 
 
These nine variables (excluding cash income) were entered into a final model to 
predict age at first birth using the backwards-stepwise procedure with the Cox regression. 
Of the eight variables entered, only the material wealth scale, the number of parents’ 
siblings, and the number of parents’ siblings’ offspring are kept in the final model. Of 
particular interest here, is that only the material wealth scale is significant (Exp(B) = 
1.219, p = 0.004), as shown in Table 3.8. The other two relational variables are not 
significant in the final model, nor were they significant when individually entered. These 
variables seem to not negatively affect the overall model fit in, and SPSS found that their 
elimination did not improve the model and the variation they explain, while neither large 
nor significant, is unique. This may be one possible explanation for why they are 
included.  
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Table 3.8 Age at first birth: Final model 
Covariate N B Standard 
error1 
Exp(B) Significance2 (p) 
Material wealth scale 272 0.198 0.068 1.219 0.004** 
Number of parents’ 
siblings 
272 0.250 0.144 1.284 0.083 
Number of parents’ 
siblings’ offspring 
272 -0.057 0.034 0.944 0.094 
Chi square-test significant at p=0.016* 
1 Robust bootstrapped standard errors, 2 Wald test significance, * Significant at p<0.05, 
** Significant at p<0.01, † Approaching significance 
 
Conclusions 
What predicts a hunter’s reproductive success in Ust’-Avam? What predicts when 
he will first have a child? These are the two questions I sought to answer in this chapter. 
The results from both the linear regression and Cox regression show that a hunter’s 
material wealth – the ownership status of the five items described earlier – is important in 
predicting variation in age-adjusted reproductive success and age at first birth.  In 
predicting a hunter’s reproductive success, both hunter’s material wealth and the hunter’s 
skill were important factors; the model with these two variables predicted 15.3% of the 
variance. These findings corroborate recent studies into hunter-gatherers in other 
societies, which I will go into more detail in Chapter 4. The more highly skilled and 
wealthy a hunter is the more offspring survive to age 5 they are likely to have.  
In predicting the age at first birth, the final model included variables that were not 
significant when individually entered or when entered in the final model using a 
backwards stepwise procedure. These variables were not eliminated because the variance 
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they explained, though small, was unique. These two variables were the number of 
parents’ siblings and the number of parents’ siblings’ offspring. The number of parents’ 
siblings had a positive coefficient (0.250), indicating that the presence of aunts and 
uncles may slightly increase the age at which a hunter may experience a first birth. The 
Exp(B) for this variable in the final model is 1.284, meaning that for every one-unit 
increase in the number of parents’ siblings, the odds of the hunter experiencing a first 
birth are 1.284 higher than the baseline. Interestingly, the number of parents’ siblings’ 
offspring (insignificantly) negatively affected when a hunter might start their 
reproductive career with a coefficient of (-0.057).  The Exp(B) for this variable is 0.944, 
indicating that for every increase in the number of parents’ siblings’ offspring, the odds 
of the individual experiencing a first birth actually decrease in relation to the baseline at 
odds of 0.944 to 1. Therefore, the number of aunts and uncles might slightly (though 
insignificantly) increase the likelihood a hunter will experience a first birth, perhaps by 
providing the hunter with resources such as childcare or food. When those aunts and 
uncles have children of their own, they are more likely to invest those resources in their 
own children, rather than their hunting nephews.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I consider how these results fit into larger debates about food 
sharing in hunter-gatherer societies, and how they further this debate. I review the 
important connections between hunter wealth and skill and social network with their 
reproductive success in light of the connection between Ust’-Avam hunters’ reproductive 
success and wealth classes.   
Food Sharing: Models of Multiplicity 
Early studies of food sharing generally looked at testing only one model of food 
sharing or another. The four models Kaplan and Hill proposed did not include the costly 
signaling hypothesis, which later researchers often test for (Smith and Bliege Bird, 2000; 
Gurven, 2004; Ziker and Schnegg, 2005; Allen-Arave, Gurven and Hill, 2008; Nolin, 
2012; Koster, 2011; Wood and Marlowe, 2013). However, Kaplan and Hill (1985b) 
began a trend in HBE that has continued over several decades, with researchers trying to 
answer the question, “what best explains food sharing?” Kaplan and Hill set out to 
examine the factors that determine food sharing among the Ache. They list four sets of 
conditions to account for the evaluation of sharing – kinship, tolerated theft, reciprocity, 
and cooperative acquisition. Nine foraging trips were recorded, during which 
investigators accompanied foragers and measured all food procured by weight and count. 
The researchers found kin selection, as a condition of the evaluation of sharing, was not 
supported by this data. They found that reciprocity accounted for some 61% of the 
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variance in food sharing (r = .78, 2 = 0.61, p < 0.000001, N = 27). Reciprocity was the 
greatest predictor of variance, and the second greatest predictor was package size.  
Betzig and Turke (1986) studied food sharing on the island of Ifaluk. They 
questioned 10 households about their food intake and distribution patterns, which resulted 
in 84 food-sharing events captured. The results suggested that sharing occurred largely 
between kin. The researchers found that kinship and distance did not intersect. 
Individuals incurred a cost to travel far to bring food to relatives. However, individuals 
were not as willing to travel to the other islet to give food, indicating there was a cost 
threshold. Recipient households generally had a greater number of dependent children. 
Betzig and Turke hoped to contribute their data to the small pool that existed at the time, 
and the findings of their research supported the kin provisioning model.  
Current studies are looking at the possibility of multiple models of food sharing at 
work in hunter-gatherer societies. Also, current researchers are re-analyzing the 
predictions and results of previous anthropologists. For example, Wood and Marlowe 
(2013) are revisiting much of the work done by Hawkes, O’Connell, and Blurton Jones 
(2001) and Hawkes et al. (2001). In 2001, Hawkes et al. found Hadza men were not 
minimizing risk and variance of meat acquisition, and were not maximizing their hunting 
returns. The researchers concluded after a series of games examining Hadza prey-choice, 
and why Hadza chose to seek large game rather than small, that men acquired benefits to 
seeking large game that did not benefit their wives or current offspring. Hawkes, 
O’Connell, and Blurton Jones (2001) in a separate study found that Hadza sharing does 
not fit the model of risk-reduction reciprocity. 
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Wood and Marlowe(2013) used data collected from Hadza foraging excursion in 
the years 2005 through 2009 to examine the causes of food sharing. They found that the 
best hunters provided 3 - 4 times more food to their families during these excursions.  
Unlike previous claims, Wood and Marlowe did not find evidence that hunting is merely 
a status-seeking activity. They also found that large animal hunting benefited the hunter’s 
households during primary distributions, and that the hunter’s wives and offspring ate 
significantly more of what they brought back than other women or children. Hadza men 
used the foods they brought home to provision their wives and kin. Hadza married men 
brought food back to camp more frequently than single men, and married men with 
children brought home the most food the most frequently. Married men with children 
were also more likely to bring home fruit. These findings show that men, when faced 
with a tradeoff between investing resources in potential future offspring with other mates, 
and investing resources in current offspring and mates, Hadza men will choose the latter. 
This echoes similar findings in these analyses, where better Ust’-Avam hunters have 
better reproductive success, but fewer opportunities to invest in acquiring other mates.  
Allen-Arave, Gurven, and Hill (2008) observed 380 complete household food 
distributions, and 635 incomplete food distributions among the Ache in Arroyo Bandera. 
They found that relatedness between households predict food sharing between 
households, and that this bias was consistent with kin selection theory. They also found 
that the only significant predictor in the model was the difference in household 
production (t252 = 4.41, p < 0.0001). Something other than inclusive fitness leads better-
off households to share with worse-off households. Allen-Arave et al. (2008) also found a 
significant, positive correlation between households within the same production class. 
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They concluded that across all levels of relatedness, households displayed dyadic 
contingency. Ache households were more likely to share with kin who will reciprocate, 
rather than kin who will benefit more greatly. These results suggest that contingent 
reciprocity occurs between close kin. In Ust’-Avam, similar findings suggest a level of 
contingent reciprocity among kin. There is also a level of contingency occurring between 
highly skilled households.  
Koster (2011) examined 35 households among the Miskito and Mayanga 
horticulturalists of Nicaragua. His findings noted that kin are likely recipients of 
exchanged meat, and that households that gave a lot tend to receive less than households 
that give little. He stated that there is a negative relationship between exchange and 
distance. There was little relationship between the exchange matrix and differences in 
household production ratios – that is, households with lower production index did not 
necessarily receive more. However, there was a relationship between households’ 
production of meat and fish and how much meat and fish they distributed to other 
households, and households with fewer meat and fish resources receiving more from 
households with greater resources. Koster summarized that resources flow from 
households with more meat to those with little. He concluded that many of these transfers 
occur in mother-offspring dyads. Koster cautioned that researchers need to distinguish 
between kin provisioning and tolerated theft. He found little evidence of reciprocity 
among the Mayangna and Miskito. While Koster’s analysis found little reciprocity in the 
community, unlike the analysis of Ust’-Avam inter-household meat transfers, he did 
stress the importance of model multiplicity.  
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Ziker and Schnegg (2005) looked at inter-household food sharing at meals in the 
community of Ust’-Avam. A sample of 50 households, with 84 household dyad 
combinations, was analyzed. The authors used QAP matrix correlation to examine 
relationships between relatedness, distance, number of hunters in the households, and 
difference in age. They concluded that provisioning of kin was the most common form of 
inter-household meals, and that asymmetrical relationships were more common among 
kin. Reciprocal hosting occurred between related households, and reciprocity did not 
occur as commonly between non-related households. Ziker and Schneggs’ findings 
mirror those in this analysis – multiple models of food sharing are at work, most 
significantly reciprocity and kin selection. Furthermore, reciprocity often occurs within 
kin selection.  
Nolin (2010) used exponential random graph modeling to test food sharing 
hypotheses of 317 households in Lamalera, Indonesia. He collected information on 
households and their sharing partners – those with whom they shared most frequently, 
resulting in 3,111 ties. Nolin found reciprocity, kinship, and distance predicted whether a 
household will give food to another household. When included with kinship and distance, 
reciprocity did not explain much more variance in food-transfers. Reciprocity was 
correlated with both kinship and distance. Nolin examined distance and its effects on 
predictions of food sharing, which was not done in this analysis. Families mostly reside 
in somewhat limited government housing in Ust’-Avam (Ziker, p.c. 2014). Some families 
occupy very small apartments, and will take what larger housing is available, despite 
distance from relatives. Also, the village is very compact, which might decrease the effect 
distance may have on village interactions.  
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Nolin (2012) again used exponential random graph modeling, but to answer a 
different question – does sharing-as-signaling predict inter-household food transfer 
relationships? A sharing network of 317 households was examined along with variables 
representing their wealth and status. Nolin found wealthy households gave food less 
frequently to other households, but received food more frequently, after controlling for 
dyadic reciprocity and differences in household production. Interestingly, higher-status 
households gave and received more food transfers than households of lower status. 
Households of men in leadership positions were more likely to reciprocate when given 
food. Excessive sharing by households with leaders is congruous with the predictions of 
sharing-as-signaling, but is mitigated by other variables in predicting food-transfers. 
Much of the sharing explained by sharing-as-signaling may be explained by other factors. 
Nolin concluded that this analysis provided evidence for multiple adaptive mechanisms 
of cooperation operating simultaneously.  
Kaplan and Hill (1985) tested four models as adaptive mechanisms for food-
sharing using data collected from the Northern Ache in Paraguay. These models were kin 
selection, tit-for-tat reciprocity, tolerated theft, and cooperative acquisition. Observations 
of Northern Ache foraging trips and consumption were made from October 1981 through 
May 1982. The results of their tests supported the tit-for-tat reciprocity and tolerated theft 
models of food sharing, but suggested kin selection as a mechanism for food sharing was 
not supported. These results are unlike many others summarized here, including my own 
analysis, in that kin selection appeared to play no role in why Ache hunters shared food. 
Smith and Bliege Bird (2000) observed turtle hunting and feasting among the 
Meriam of Torres Strait. They provided a preliminary framework with which to view 
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instances of sharing as examples of costly signaling. The Meriam hunters provided turtles 
for feasts, and had little control over the distribution of the turtle meat. Smith and Bliege 
Bird judged that the sharing is an honest signal of the abilities of the hunter: it is costly; 
unlikely to be reciprocated; a true signal in that it reaches a broad audience; and seemed 
to benefit both the signalers and the hunters. These are the four conditions listed that 
needed to be met in order to consider costly signaling as an avenue of cooperation. After 
putting for their hypothesis of the feasibility of a costly signaling model, Smith and 
Bliege Bird suggested future publications provide empirically testable hypotheses, and 
allow their framework to be tested. Sharing in Ust’-Avam does not necessarily meet the 
four requirements for costly signaling since the ‘signal’ is one that can easily be 
reciprocated, and hunters have much more control over the distribution of their game. 
Hunting in Ust’-Avam also appears to occur more regularly than the turtle-hunting in 
Meriam. Gurven et al. (2000) proposed one reason the Ache share food from their hunts 
is so that they receive food when they are sick or injured. Researchers proposed this 
sharing occurred to signal cooperative intent, and they received more shares when unable 
to hunt due to health issues than those who shared less. They analyzed this by looking at 
380 food distributions and recording donors, recipients, and package sizes. They also 
surveyed individuals on the last time they were unable to hunt from sickness or injury. 
They found that philanthropic and means-well classified individuals received more shares 
when they were sick than greedy and ne’er-do-well individuals (these classifications were 
dependent on the amount of food produced in relation to the amount of food shared by 
the individual). These results led Gurven et al. to argue that long-term payoffs in food 
sharing may compensate for short-term costs. This generosity is similar to the results I 
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noted earlier in food-sharing: unidirectional food transfers were occurring between 
households, most likely as generosity signaling.  
Gurven (2004) tested models of sharing based on non-tit-for-tat reciprocity as risk 
reduction, and tolerated scrounging using data collected from the Hiwi and the Ache. 
Information about package size, amounts given to recipients, number of recipients, and 
number of successful hunts and hunters on a given day was recorded to test Gurven’s 
predictions. These predictions were designed to test both sharing breadth and depth, and 
were derived from assumptions of the diminishing marginal value of food packages. He 
found that variable, large packages were shared more than smaller, more consistently 
acquired packages. Gurven also reported contingency between donor and recipient 
individuals.  Although he found evidence of reciprocal altruism as a mechanism of food 
sharing, he stressed its importance not as a single model for explaining variation in food 
sharing, but rather as an important contribution alongside other models. Gurven stressed 
the importance of the marginal value of food in testing food sharing models. I did not 
examine diminishing marginal value of food shared from hunter’s food packages.  
The results from my analyses, as stated before, support evidence of more than one 
model of food sharing explaining the variance in transfers. This is an important point that 
needs to be stressed – multiple models of food sharing may be working as adaptive 
mechanisms of cooperation in a society at a given time. Multiple models may explain 
differing amounts of variance in food transfers between individuals and households. 
However, between societies the importance of kin, reciprocity, generosity, and costly 
signaling differ greatly. For example, in Ust’-Avam, there was little supported evidence 
of costly signaling, but there was evidence for this model among the Meriam (Smith and 
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Bliege Bird, 2000). Not only does the applicability of these models vary across societies, 
different factors such as distance vary between societies. Distance was an important 
factor in explaining variance in food transfers in Lamalera (Nolin, 2010), but Ziker has 
hypothesized it plays no noticeable role in meat and food sharing decisions in Ust’-Avam 
(Ziker, p.c. 2014). Neighborhood as a proxy for distance did significantly predict 
reciprocated food sharing at meals (Ziker and Schnegg, 2005), but did not significantly 
predict unreciprocated food transfers. Societies, communities, and individuals differ in 
how they share food, and the mechanisms behind that decision also vary.  
Reproductive Success and Wealth 
The results of the analysis of Ust’-Avam hunters’ reproductive success show that 
men who spend time investing in their own wealth – embodied, material, and relational – 
are also more likely to reproduce earlier and have more offspring. Men have the choice to 
either invest in their education or invest in their hunting skill acquisition – men who 
choose to invest in education are probably more likely to leave the community to find 
work or continue their education at university in the city. Men are faced with a choice: do 
they choose to invest their time into acquiring traditional skills such as hunting, trapping, 
and fishing, or do they seek employment elsewhere? 
Irons (1979) was one of the first to test the influence of cultural success on 
biological success by analyzing the Yomut Turkmen. The numbers of offspring for every 
adult were counted, and their land and cattle holdings were recorded. He found that 
wealthier males experienced greater reproductive success, and that variation in male 
fitness is greater than female fitness. Possible reasons that wealth positively affected 
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reproductive success were that families of wealth males were better fed, and wealthy men 
were frequently polygynous.  
Kaplan, Hill, et al published data on male Ache foragers and reproductive success 
(1985). Few studies had been conducted that attempted to predict, or even measure, 
reproductive success in hunter-gatherer societies. Over the course of five years, 
information about Ache food acquisition, time allocation, and food distribution had been 
collected. The researchers found that there was no correlation between hunter acquisition 
amount and the amount his family ate. This led them to ask, how would hunter skill be 
favored by natural selection? Possible explanations as to why skilled hunters would hunt, 
and subsequently share, include better alliances, greater access to mates, and bias towards 
their offspring. Three predictions were made to test these questions: better hunters would 
have better RS, they would have more extramarital affairs, and they would have more 
offspring result from these affairs. They found good hunters were reported to have more 
extramarital affairs and that good hunters had more illegitimate children (p < 0.05). The 
better Ache foragers had better reproductive success. There were a few problems with 
this preliminary study. The researchers did not control for age, and they had a very small 
sample size. Older hunters may have had the chance ot have more offspring by virtue of 
having a longer reproductive career. They did not have complete genealogical 
information about hunters and their offspring. The Ache were investing resources into 
future potential reproductive opportunities with other women.  
Borgerhoff-Mulder (1987) studied the effects of wealth on reproductive success 
among the Kipsigis of Kenya. A positive correlation between wealth and reproductive 
success indicates a connection between the two. Reproductive variance in Kipsigis men 
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was due mostly in part to polygyny and increased access to women. Wealthier men were 
found to marry at younger ages than poor men. They were also found not to provide 
abundant resources for their offspring. These findings indicate that the Kipsigis men were 
not investing in their current offspring, but rather investing in acquiring wealth to gain 
access to additional wives, and have more children.  
Cronk (1991) studied the relationship of wealth and status with reproductive 
success among the Mukogodo. The society is poorer than their neighbors, and its 
members have a decreased ability to acquire additional wives. Livestock wealth and male 
reproductive success are correlated positively, controlling for age. This reproductive 
success seems to be facilitated by polygyny, and the access to additional wives wealth 
gives a Mukodogo man. There are no correlations between reproductive success and 
wages or education. These results are similar to those from Ust’-Avam – education and 
income were not significant predictors of male RS, but embodied and material wealth 
were in the forms of hunter skill and the hunter material wealth scale. However, polygyny 
is not practiced in Ust’-Avam, so another mechanism is most likely facilitating the 
increase in offspring.  
In Ust’-Avam, there are no records of extra-marital affairs. Marriage dates were 
not collected, and birth of a child is used as a proxy. The community is socially 
monogamous, and there is little information about extramarital affairs. Among the 
Mukogodo, Kipsigis, and the Yomut Turkmen, increased reproductive success was 
facilitated by greater access to women. There is little evidence to indicate that men and 
women in Ust’-Avam are engaging in greater amounts of extramarital affairs. Better and 
 
55 
wealthier hunters are more likely to have greater numbers of children through 
provisioning.  
Conclusion 
In the food sharing study, different measures for need could have been included 
and tested. Many researchers have used different proxies to establish need. For example, 
counts of children under the age of 5 could have acted as a proxy for need by indicating 
increased levels of consumption in that particular household.   
As is, these studies provide valuable insight into what hunters do with the food 
they bring back to the village – do they share it or do they keep it? Furthermore, why do 
they share? The findings of both analyses lend information to the growing bodies of 
knowledge about these subjects in HBE. While Ust’-Avam men do not share for reasons 
consistent with hunters in other societies, they are sharing patterns are not wholly unique, 
either. Instead, these patterns echo what more recent studies are saying – that multiple 
mechanisms are operating simultaneously in communities and facilitating cooperation. 
That food sharing often operates within the bounds of kin selection and reciprocal 
altruism is a common finding, and that reciprocal altruism occurs often between kin is 
another. I think what is a more unique outcome here is: 1) kinship operating alongside 
controls for kinship * reciprocity and reciprocity * sum of skill; and 2) generous transfers 
controlling for kinship, reciprocity, sum of skill and interaction terms, AND frequency of 
receiving in another currency. 
In regard to the second analysis, even in more (not necessarily fully) egalitarian 
hunter-gatherer societies, wealthier and more skilled men exhibit greater reproductive 
success. Does this increased fitness result from men having more children with different 
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women, or from men having healthier children with the same woman? Another way of 
looking at this tradeoff is do wealthier men spread their resources among many different 
offspring, and women in hopes of gaining increased reproductive access? Or do they 
focus these resources on providing for their current offspring and ensuring they survive to 
reproduce? The men in Ust’-Avam tend to invest more in their current offspring. 
However, as discussed earlier, in some societies men increase their fitness through 
polygyny, such opportunities are limited in Ust’-Avam. These studies have furthered 
current academic debates about these subjects, and provided information that can be 
included in future comparisons.  
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